

# **Sudan**

## **Mid-Term Evaluation**

**Thematic window: Conflict Prevention and Peace Building**

**Programme Title: Sustained Peace for Development: Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building in Sudan through targeted interventions in selected communities along the 1-1-1956 border**

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## Prologue

The current mid-term evaluation report is part of the efforts being implemented by the Millennium Development Goal Secretariat (MDG-F), as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy, to promote learning and to improve the quality of the 128 joint programs in 8 development thematic windows according to the basic evaluation criteria inherent to evaluation; relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

The aforementioned mid-term evaluations have been carried out amidst the backdrop of an institutional context that is both rich and varied, and where several UN organizations, working hand in hand with governmental agencies and civil society, cooperate in an attempt to achieve priority development objectives at the local, regional, and national levels. Thus the mid-term evaluations have been conducted in line with the principles outlined in the Evaluation network of the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) - as well as those of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In this respect, the evaluation process included a reference group comprising the main stakeholders involved in the joint programme, who were active participants in decisions making during all stages of the evaluation; design, implementation, dissemination and improvement phase.

The analysis contained in the mid-term evaluation focuses on the joint program at its mid-term point of implementation- approximately 18 months after it was launched. Bearing in mind the limited time period for implementation of the programs (3 years at most), the mid-term evaluations have been devised to serve as short-term evaluation exercises. This has limited the scope and depth of the evaluation in comparison to a more standard evaluation exercise that would take much longer time and resources to be conducted. Yet it is clearly focusing on the utility and use of the evaluation as a learning tool to improve the joint programs and widely disseminating lessons learnt.

This exercise is both a first opportunity to constitute an independent “snapshot” of progress made and the challenges posed by initiatives of this nature as regards the 3 objectives being pursued by the MDG-F; the change in living conditions for the various populations vis-à-vis the Millennium Development Goals, the improved quality in terms of assistance provided in line with the terms and conditions outlined by the Declaration of Paris as well as progress made regarding the reform of the United Nations system following the “Delivering as One” initiative.

As a direct result of such mid-term evaluation processes, plans aimed at improving each joint program have been drafted and as such, the recommendations contained in the report have now become specific initiatives, seeking to improve upon implementation of all joint programs evaluated, which are closely monitored by the MDG-F Secretariat.

Conscious of the individual and collective efforts deployed to successfully perform this mid-term evaluation, we would like to thank all partners involved and to dedicate this current document to all those who have contributed to the drafting of the same and who have helped it become a reality (members of the reference group, the teams comprising the governmental agencies, the joint program team, consultants, beneficiaries, local authorities, the team from the Secretariat as well as a wide range of institutions and individuals from the public and private sectors). Once again, our heartfelt thanks.

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation report do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDG-F Secretariat.

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**Sustained Peace for Development: Conflict  
Prevention and Peace-Building in Sudan  
through targeted interventions in selected  
communities along the 1-1-1956 border**

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**Mid Term Evaluation**

**The Sudan**

Prepared for:

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/  
MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F)**

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## List of Acronyms Used

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CO	Country Office
COA	Chart of Accounts
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	Community Security and Arms Control
DDR	Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
IA	Interagency
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JP	Joint Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDG-F	Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund
MTE	Mid Term Evaluation
NSC	National Steering Committee
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
PMC	Programme Management Committee
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SKS	Southern Kordofan State
SPD	Sustained Peace for Development
SPLA	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	UN Fund for Population Assistance
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNW	UN Women
WHO	World Health Organization

## Executive Summary

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The Sustained Peace for Development programme is a two and a half year, multi-agency project that is funded through the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F). Its primary aim is to promote peace building and effective conflict management in the border areas between Sudan and South Sudan, by addressing capacity gaps in national peacebuilding institutions, and increasing security and peace dividends for communities in the target areas.

This mid-term evaluation was conducted in November-December 2011, with an in-country mission in early November 2011. It covers the first 18 months of implementation from late December 2010-June 2011, although progress updates are provided up until the time of the evaluation mission.

There are many positive achievements during the first half of the project, notably:

1. **Interagency Collaboration:** The JP has developed a distinct identity as a unique, inter-agency initiative, created a sense of shared purpose amongst partner agencies and has a good level of formal and informal coordination.
2. **Quality Assessments:** The JP employed a series of cascading assessment tools to identify conflict triggers and garner community input into possible means of mitigating these. The resulting analysis is sophisticated and addresses issues of balance and equality, providing a sound foundation for project interventions.
3. **Conflict Sensitivity Training:** A training in conflict sensitive programming for the partner agencies (provided by UNDP) was very useful, with agencies reporting it influenced how they approached programming in the JP well as in their other projects.

The JP has been operating in a particularly challenging environment, with several factors complicating project implementation. Notably, these include the referendum and local elections in early 2011, the secession of South Sudan in July 2011 and the resulting split of the JP, and the relocation of the majority of UN staff (100% for some agencies) out of Kadugli following widespread violence in June 2011. These and other factors have resulted in the progress and overall health of the JP being lower than anticipated at the time of the evaluation mission.

Several areas have been identified where improvements can be made, and are explained in detail in this report. Some of the main issues identified during the evaluation can be broadly grouped as follows:

- 1) **Project Stasis:** Since the relocation of many UN agencies from Kadugli to Khartoum in June 2011, much of the JP is in a state of inertia. A 'wait and see' approach is being followed by many agencies regarding a change in movement restrictions. In the absence of evidence that a substantial change is likely, limited contingency planning has been done to answer the question of how to move forward in the current situation.

- 2) **Assessments vs Implementation:** A series of progressively more detailed, inclusive assessments have been done to identify conflict triggers and community-led solutions. However, this has been a lengthy process with limited follow through in terms of delivering 'peace dividends' as a result, as many agencies were poised to begin activities when UN staff were relocated out of Kadugli in June 2011
- 3) **Government Engagement:** Concerns were expressed at the central level over the limited involvement of line ministries at the PMC level, potentially leaving the JP at risk of a lack of alignment with wider government priorities. This is not to imply that government is not engaged in the project, but that the composition of the PMC may not adequately reflect all appropriate bodies.

A summary of conclusions and recommendations are as listed on the next page.

	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
1.	The JP had several significant structural design issues that have contributed to a lack of coherence and a fragmented approach to delivery.	The NCS/JP Management should identify areas of convergence where the inherent fragmentation can be reduced, such as functionally combining outputs where there is opportunity for genuine collaboration between agencies.
2.	There is a lack of clarity regarding expenditures and total agency budgets (in some cases) between North and South. This makes it difficult for the JP as a whole to present itself accurately to the Government and to plan a 'whole JP' approach.	Agencies should clarify to the NSC on total budget and expenditure information for JP activities in Sudan. This will be required for reporting to the MDG-F for the second half of 2011.
3.	There was no credible case made on the value of including so many (8) UN agencies under the project, or how they would fit together to produce coherent, strategic impact. The disparate mandates, local focus and (lack of) presence in Kadugli make genuine joint implementation an elusive goal.	Collaboration between agencies should be strategic and rational, based on complimentary activities and priorities in the JP target areas. Potential areas of synergy emerged during the evaluation mission, such as FAO and IOM in terms of planning water yard locations based on stock migration routes. These more specific opportunities for joint action should be identified and pursued, as they are more likely to a) occur, and b) have an added value in doing so.
4.	The JP is in a state of stasis with no fixed end date or viable solutions; since June, many agencies with planned activities are in a holding pattern. Several agencies have contracts (eg FAO, UNFPA) with IP's that cannot implement activities due to the security situation, but no action has been taken to remedy this in the past six months.	If contracts cannot be fulfilled because of security restrictions for certain IP's, alternative partners should be sought or funding reallocated to agencies that are better equipped to implement activities in the current situation. The justification for using those IP's was they could access areas where UN agencies could not; if this is not the case then new solutions

		are needed and the existing contracts should be terminated.
5	Progress to date has been heavy on assessments, comparatively light on tangible “dividends of peace” that are considered to be a cornerstone of the JP’s approach. This is largely due to bad timing; just as many activities were poised to start, UN staff were relocated out of SKS, effectively halting the work of many agencies	Stronger focus should be put on providing some tangible support to affected communities, within a coherent framework, once access is resumed. If needed, alternative IP’s should be sought if contracted organizations are unable to access target areas.
6.	Despite its importance throughout the lifecycle of the project cycle, particularly in a volatile operating environment such as Southern Kordofan, risk management is not being done.	A risk management plan should be developed/updated looking forward at the final months of the project. The updated risk matrix should be supplied to the NSC prior to meetings to ensure management is fully informed of current risks and proposed mitigation steps.
7.	The conflict sensitivity training conducted by UNDP for partner agencies was extremely useful, with agencies reporting that it influenced their programming in the JP and other interventions. It is a positive example of interagency collaboration that can have wide ranging impact on the quality of crisis/post-conflict programming in Sudan.	This type of training should be expanded, focusing (based on feedback) on more practical elements of conflict sensitive implementation.
8.	Linkages between the activities and actors operating in Warrup and SKS did not materialize as envisioned in the project document.	The JP could provide a forum for an interagency discussion amongst agencies working in Warrup and SKS to discuss trends, lessons learned and identify more coherent UN responses.
9.	The joint assessments provided an informed basis for programming, although it is unclear that they had any substantial impact on informing agencies’ decisions about what activities they would engage in.	JP activities need to be reviewed in a NSC setting to ensure that activities are appropriate to the context, and that functional linkages can be developed between agency

		activities to the degree possible.
10.	The composition of the PMC in Kadugli does not appropriately represent key line ministries, which may contribute to a lack of alignment with wider governmental priorities.	Enhanced representation of key line ministry representatives should be pursued when the PMC is reestablished in Kadugli.
11.	Buram is considered to be completely off limits to all agencies due to security issues and there is no indication that this will change in the foreseeable future.	An alternative locality should be selected as urgently as possible, considering the principles of balance, 'do no harm' and accessibility.
12.	Given the long delay in activities due to access restrictions, there is very little chance the JP will achieve all of its planned outputs and outcomes in the time allotted.	With the unpredictability of the operating environment, coupled with a somewhat passive approach to seeking new solutions in many cases, an extension should not be considered at this time until a shift occurs in forward planning. Any extension request should be predicated on a sound plan of action that addresses the challenges in a concrete, realistic manner.
13.	A communication strategy has been developed, which has provided good internal communications and developed a fairly clear identity for the JP as a unique initiative.	External communications could be strengthened to raise the public visibility of the project, highlighting the fact that the UN agencies involved are working in partnership to promote peacebuilding in Sudan through visibility efforts focused on target areas. This would be particularly important when/if activities resume in a more substantial manner.
14.	Sustainability of interventions (completed and upcoming) is at risk due to the lengthy break in activities and the geographical spread of target areas.	A plan should be developed on how gains made will be sustained over time, likely done by assigning responsibility for this to individual agencies following the closure of the project.

# Introduction

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## Joint Programme Context

1. After decades of civil war, the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provided unprecedented opportunities for peace building and improving the humanitarian and development context of the Sudan.
2. Despite many positive outcomes of the implementation of the CPA, tensions remain prevalent in many areas, particularly along the 1-1-1956 border. A lack of peace dividends for conflict-affected communities in border areas contributes to the fragility of the situation.
3. On July 22, 2009 the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) released its ruling on the boundaries of the Abyei Area. Despite the parties' expressed willingness to implement the PCA ruling, resource-based tensions among neighboring communities (notably the Misseriya and Dinka-Ngok) have perpetuated continued pressures.
4. Within the Joint Programme (JP) target areas, poverty rates are estimated at up to 90% , along with possessing the lowest development indicators in the country.<sup>1</sup> In general, an absence of social services and livelihood opportunities, and perceptions of isolation and marginalization all contribute to undermining durable peace in the border areas. Migration corridors being blocked by oil developments exacerbate these feelings, and industrial farming, pressures on grazing and water resources and struggles over land rights contribute to instability.
5. Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of troops from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) also poses risk as a conflict trigger, especially between those being resettled/returned and host communities.
6. In recent months, fighting between the SAF and SPLA in Southern Kordofan and Abyei has intensified, leading to increased tensions and significant internal displacement throughout the JP's target areas. At the time of the evaluation mission, there are regular reports of active hostilities between the SAF and SPLA-North.
7. Southern Kordofan, the primary target areas of the JP, was created under the CPA by merging the states of South and West Kordofan. The population is very diverse, and some of the fiercest fighting in the war took place here leaving a legacy of deeply divided communities. Localities chosen for the JP include Keliak, Muglad and Buram.

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<sup>1</sup> The Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS), 2006.


8. In June 2011, violence and looting in Kadugli forced many UN agencies to relocate their staff to Khartoum and cease almost all operations in Southern Kordofan. Many offices were ransacked and/or destroyed, and most UN agencies have not returned to Kadugli or have a greatly reduced presence. (IOM, UNICEF and FAO, to a reduced degree, are operating in Kadugli at the time of the evaluation mission). The JP staff member based in Kadugli was relocated to Khartoum from June-November 2011, at which time she left the project.
9. Political events during the JP implementation period have significantly disrupted the ability of development organizations to operate effectively. Notably, these include the CPA referendum on separation in January 2011, local elections in April 2011, and the secession of South Sudan in July. At the time of writing this report (Nov 2011), access to the localities covered by the JP is unpredictable (Boram is considered completely unreachable) and the security situation is fluid.

### **Sustained Peace for Development Programme**


10. The Sustained Peace for Development (SPD) joint programme seeks to promote peace building and effective conflict management along the 1-1-1956 border area by addressing capacity gaps in national peace building institutions, and increasing security and peace dividends for communities in the target areas.
11. The JP has identified four outputs under two outcomes, contributing to UNDAF outcome 1 which states that “By 2012, the environment for sustainable peace in Sudan is improved through increased respect for rights and human security, with special attention to individuals and communities directly affected by the conflict”.
12. Outcome 1 of the project aims to improve partnerships and the utilization of conflict risk information at the state level to enhance capacity of peace building institutions, promoting solutions that are locally identified, promote social cohesion and are more effectively targeted.
13. Outcome 2 focuses on recovery, reconciliation and reintegration at the community level through basic service delivery and enhancement of economic opportunities. Interventions under Outcome 2 are to be based in large part on information collected under Outcome 1.
14. The SPD was approved on 07 December 2009 by the MDG-F Steering Committee and signed by all partners by 23 November 2009. The project budget approved is \$6,000,000 over a period of two and a half years, running from 10 December 2009 to 09 June 2012. This money was split between UN teams in Sudan and South Sudan. JP The SPD has UNDP as the lead agency partnering with UNICEF, UN Women, ILO, FAO, IOM, WHO and UNFPA, with the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) and the Southern Kordofan Governor’s Office as the main government counterparts.

15. In the last NSC meeting for the national JP held in Khartoum in June 2011, it was decided that the JP would be split and a new NSC should be formed in South Sudan to assume management over the programme. This marks the official split of the JP between the Sudan and South Sudan.

16. A financial summary as of June 2011 is below. This is cumulative between JP operations in the Sudan and South Sudan, as no disaggregated budget or expenditures has been provided to date. Individual agencies were asked during the in country mission for expenditure report split between North and South, but few of these have been provided.



# Delivery



## Mid Term Evaluation

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### Objectives

17. This mid-term evaluation has the following **specific objectives**:
18. To discover the programme's design quality and internal coherence (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies and the Millennium Development Goals, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.
19. To understand how the joint programme operates and assess the efficiency of its management model in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the One UN framework.
20. To identify the programme's degree of effectiveness among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Building thematic window, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

### Scope of the MTE

21. This mid-term evaluation assesses progress of implementation of the JP from its inception until 60% through its approved period. The JP officially started in December 2009 when the first year funds were transferred to the UN agencies. The evaluation will include 6 quarters from the beginning of January 2010 to the end of June 2011.
22. The mid-term evaluation is an important opportunity in the programme cycle to review progress against initial project targets and identify challenges and opportunities moving ahead. The primary value of an MTE is as a forward-looking exercise...reorienting activities and approaches given the experience of the first half of project implementation. It should look at impact of programme activities (positive and negative) and not just report on activity level achievements.

### Methodology

23. The first step in the MTE was a **desk review** of relevant documents, in this case including: Project Document, JP meeting minutes, project monitoring reports, PMC and

NSC meeting minutes and Field Visit Reports. This inception report is based strictly on this desk review.

24. An in-country mission took place between 2-19 November 2011, where a combination of first hand observation, interviews and discussion groups were used. Interviews were held with project staff and focal points from all partner agencies, government counterparts at the Central level, AECID, the RCO, and the UNDP Country Office.
25. Following the initial interviews, a briefing was held with JP partners (agencies and government) on the preliminary observations and conclusions, followed by an open discussion and feedback.
26. Following the mission, a draft MTE report was shared with the MDG-F and country team in accordance with the timeline set out in the TOR.

### **Constraints and limitations on the study conducted**

27. **Access:** Due to travel restrictions, field visits to SKS were not permitted so all interviews were conducted in Khartoum. The possibility of engaging a national consultant was explored but not pursued when it was clarified that they would not get the necessary travel authorization either. Due to the relocation of most UN staff to Khartoum from Kadugli since mid 2011, it was possible to meet with many staff that had been working in Kadugli during the period when project activities were ongoing.

## **Main Substantive and Financial Progress of the Joint Programme**

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### **Findings**

#### **Design level**

#### **Relevance**

28. The JP document makes a clear case that it seeks to address a critical need in the Sudan, particularly in terms of combining institutional capacity development with community level interventions to promote an environment where peace is made more possible. It also ties in clearly with national priorities, the CPA and the UNDAF.
29. There are several design issues that limit the potential and prospects of the joint programme.
30. One issue is the separation of outputs by agency, which encourages a fragmented approach to addressing the needs of communities in the target area. While it is expected that agencies will work in their respective areas of expertise, pre-project division creates no incentive for collaboration and by default allows for a disparate approach to implementation.
31. Similarly, deciding and dividing the budget along agency lines well before the project began greatly limits the ability of the JP to be flexible in responding to shifting priorities. Over 1.5 years passed between project development and actual mobilization; in a fluid environment like the Sudan, local priorities and the project context can change dramatically. The ability of the JP to be responsive to the current operating environment, particularly after the needs assessments, was extremely limited by the fact that funds were already allocated for particular purposes.
32. In an attempt to harmonize the project as a 'national project' for all Sudan, there was limited scope for differentiated programming between North and South, despite the notable differences in contexts and government/agency capacity in each area.
33. The project did not adequately account for the political context or relationship between the government in Khartoum and Juba, nor plan any risk mitigation strategy in the case of a vote for secession midway through the project. The coordination team hired under the project were based in Khartoum and Southern Kordofan, with coordination in South Sudan being spearheaded from the North.
34. The sheer number of agencies and respective government counterparts (often different in North and South, and even at the Khartoum/state level) makes this a very challenging and unwieldy project to manage effectively. There was no credible link made on the value of including so many (8) UN agencies under the project, or how they would fit together to produce coherent, strategic impact.

## **Scope**

35. The intended geographical reach is focused but the number of partners and proposed activities/outputs is extremely ambitious. The project is organized around 2 outcomes and 4 outputs, but there are 15 'sub-outputs' being implemented by eight UN agencies, which raise questions about how effectively these can be managed and integrated.
36. With the difficulties of implementing projects in Southern Kordofan (access, distance, security, capacity, etc.), notably with the ongoing travel restrictions and volatility in the border areas since mid-2011, the JP may have been unrealistic about its ability to achieve all of the targets set out in the project document in such a fluid context.

## **Time**

37. The challenges of implementing project in the border areas of Sudan, coupled with the referendum and secession and resulting reorganization of the project, suggests that the project document may not have allocated sufficient time to adequately position itself north and south of the border. The JP document did not set out a clear plan for project reorientation following the possible secession of South Sudan.

## **Cost**

38. Given the number of UN agencies involved, and the fact that for many agencies the money was divided by two de facto country programmes, funding levels are quite low which has, in some cases, impacted agency engagement as well as hopes for sustainable impact in any one area or output.
39. In terms of planning and budgeted versus actual expenditure per output, agencies were largely unable to provide disaggregated budgets between North and South.

## **Processes level**

### **Efficiency**

40. As of the end of the evaluation period (June 2011, 60% of the project duration), overall delivery stands at 34%. This represents delivery of both North and South components.
41. A breakdown of progress by agency is as follows, current as of November 2011. There is a fair variation in progress by the different areas, where some have completed some/all of their workplan while others had made contractual agreements to begin but have not moved forward since June. The delayed start for some agencies reflected the degree to which agencies already had existing presence and staff in SKS when the project started.

Expected Results	Responsible Agency	Achievements to Date
1.1 Improved partnerships and utilisation of conflict risk information at state level to enhance capacity of relevant peace building institution	UNDP	Engagement of CRMA project in developing usable information to identify 3 localities. Led a process of designing an assessment questionnaire with feedback from all partner agencies Organized joint assessment missions to determine specific villages/areas to target, and generate socioeconomic information Conducted Conflict sensitivity training for UN partner agencies M&E Workshop for partner agencies Lessons Learned workshop October 2011
1.2 Increased capacity of Land Commission and traditional authorities to resolve disputes of over natural resources	• FAO	Signed 3 agreements with government bodies, 2 for training of community animal health workers, 1 with WES around construction of water yard in Harazaya Kadugli. Work not started yet.
2.1 Increased access to basic services for conflict affected communities	IOM	Built a water yard in Harazaya Keilak Conducted training (mechanical maintenance, sanitation, water management, managing water disputes)
	WHO	Could not meet with staff to confirm status of activities
2.2 Increased livelihood opportunities in target communities through establishment of Local Economic Recovery fora	ILO	Activities planned and contract signed with NGO for implementation.
2.3 Improved community confidence in local rule of law institutions in South Sudan	UNDP	
2.4.1 Establish a Special Protection Unit (SPU) (former Women and Children's desks) in Warrap State	UNICEF	• N/A
2.4.2 Train 10 professionals to work with children in contact with the law (police, social workers, judges, etc.)	UNICEF	2 water yards completed (Siteb, Mugadama, both in Muglad), last one awaiting location Latrine construction and Water provision at schools: 1 done, 3 ongoing 8 classrooms built 6 child friendly spaces 40 PTA's and 5 school committees received training package
2.4.3 Women's capacity to access justice strengthened and justice institutions more responsive to gender issues	UNW	Currently developing guidelines on gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding activities
2.4.4. Ministry of Health and its health care providers able to provide qualitative and efficient health care services for sexual assault survivors	UNFPA	Conducted training on GBV and women's rights
2.4.5. Improve access to GBV prevention and response services in Warrap	UNFPA	GBV training with community health stakeholders
2.4.6. Build the capacity of state ministries to provide leadership and coordinate GBV prevention and response activities	UNFPA	

42. Much of the progress by the JP to date has been establishing a functioning coordination mechanism amongst agencies and arranging a series of joint assessments to narrow down target areas and identify specific interventions to be undertaken. Many of the community level activities had not started by the end of the evaluation period; nor by the time of the evaluation mission due to the relocation of UN staff and operational restrictions.
43. A clear focus has been put on the acquisition and utilization of quantitative and qualitative data to inform programming. Joint assessment missions have been undertaken to Buram, Mugland and Keilak, following initial analysis through the Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis project. This provided solid and sophisticated analysis of the triggers of conflict and community input on possible mitigation options.
44. The analysis resulted in a responsible and conflict sensitive prioritization, based on principles of equality and balanced support to various communities.
45. Many agencies have entered into agreements with implementing partners for certain activities that have been in a holding pattern since June 2011. IOM and UNICEF, both of which have maintained much stronger presences in Kadugli since June, have completed some (UNICEF) or all (IOM) of their activities.
46. Both formal and informal coordination mechanisms and information sharing appears to be well developed, with regular meetings, area allocation for similar interventions and joint decision-making. Establishment of a PMC at the state level for enhanced local coordination is very positive given the complexity of the situation Southern Kordofan and the number of stakeholders involved, and seemed to be quite effective.

### **Communication and Advocacy**

47. A communications strategy exists and has been implemented on a limited basis, focusing more on internal communications (information sharing) and JP representation at coordination meetings.
48. The JP has managed to create and communicate a distinct and visible identity despite its relatively small budget; partners and government understand it as a unique, joint UN initiative.

### **Risk Management**

49. The project document does not contain a risk analysis section or steps/ideas on how to mitigate them, despite the high probability (now a reality) of secession and the reasonable probability (now a reality) of a resurgence of active conflict in the target areas. No evidence of on-going risk management efforts has been provided to date; the project seems to be in stasis while waiting for a change in status of access into SKS despite a lack of evidence supporting a quick return to normal operations.

## **M&E Structures**

50. Monitoring and Evaluation is handled by the Coordination Team, which included (for a period) a dedicated M&E Officer. A set of revised indicators was developed mid-project, and an M&E workshop was held with partner agencies. Overall, the M&E framework is not particularly specific in its indicators, making it difficult for the JP to meaningfully track change over time. Most are activity based (e.g. # of trainings conducted to assess increased institutional capacity, # of PTA's formed, etc) and baseline information is limited.
51. NSC Meetings have been held fairly regularly with a good level of participation, and PMC meetings held in Kadugli appeared to provide a good forum for functional, ground level coordination and information sharing.
52. There were no JP monitoring missions since the start of activity-level implementation, limiting information collection to agency submissions. Within UNDP, the JP is firmly rooted in the wider conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities of the CPRU and is part of the CO monitoring and evaluation plan.

## **Project Management Arrangements**

53. The primary coordination body for the JP is the National Steering Committee (NSC), which was held in Khartoum with representation of the South Sudan component participating. A dedicated Programme Coordinator supports the JP and reports to the NSC, and is supported by an M&E Officer (initially), followed by a Project Officer based in Kadugli. The PMC is held in SKS at the implementation level to better facilitate practical collaboration. Both bodies appear to be functioning well and in a complementary fashion.
54. The JP is well integrated into the CPRU of the UNDP CO and operates as a component of UNDP's conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. This serves to anchor it in the wider CP and PB efforts.
55. The last NSC was held in Khartoum in June 2011, where it was agreed that a new NSC would be created in Juba following the secession of South Sudan. This marks the official split of the JP.

## **Operational Issues**

56. Few operational issues were identified as problematic during interviews with agencies in terms of internal/JP financial management or procurement.
57. Agencies that have no/limited presence in Kadugli report difficulties in logistics of arranging regular travel to Kadugli and particularly the localities, even prior to June 2011 when access was comparatively easier. Many have contracts with local implementing partners that are similarly unable to conduct activities in the target localities.

## Inter-Agency Coordination

58. There is a high degree of interaction between the agencies, particularly those with staff members based permanently in Kadugli where more operational engagement takes place. A sense of the JP as a unique initiative and camaraderie among the JP focal points has been developed, which is noteworthy considering the relatively small budget.
59. The joint assessments were an interagency effort that provided with a common platform to understand the scope, sources and possible mitigation measures of conflict in the target area.
60. Coordination under the JP allowed for a geographic division of activities between the agencies, particularly when multiple agencies (e.g. UNICEF, IOM, FAO) were implementing similar activities (e.g. construction of water yards).
61. The cross border interaction between UN agencies and partners operating in SKS and Warrap did not materialize in the way envisaged in the project document. There is an opportunity here to bring the different actors together to discuss strategies and lessons learned on two sides of the border.
62. In terms of IA coordination being a continuum<sup>2</sup>, the JP reduced duplication and achieved some degree of integrated planning, related mainly to clear information sharing. Types of interventions were mainly stock activities of each agency, with no real examples of innovative, collaborative approaches being utilized. There were discussions about opportunities for real joint activities between certain agencies (e.g. FAO/IOM) but these were not taken forward following the relocation of UN staff out of Kadugli.
63. Implementation can best be described as parallel, rather than joint. Agencies implement activities independently with limited interaction or planned sequencing. The degree of IA coordination achieved in the JP is illustrated by the blue line

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Avoid Duplication: Not doing the same thing in the same place<sup>2</sup>

Planning: Coherent plan to deliver complementary services in a well timed manner

Joint Implementation: Leveraging economies of scale, comparative advantages, technical expertise and relationships

Strategic Impact: Producing a sustainable result that is greater than the sum of its parts



### **Government Engagement**

- 64. The Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) is the main government counterpart at the central level. In SKS, the primary counterpart is the Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism (RPCM), a body created under the Governor’s Office.
- 65. MIC expressed concern about the lack of line ministry involvement at the implementation level (i.e. in SKS), as they do not participate in the PMC in Kadugli. This creates a possibility of JP activities not being aligned with broader government strategy at the provincial level.
- 66. Engagement with the RPCM and the Governor’s Office in Kadugli appears to be very high, with significant support being given to the RPCM by the JP. The JP has engaged the CRMA within SKS to assist the RPCM in producing analysis and data to better inform planning and coordination of PB activities.

### **Results level**

#### **Effectiveness**

- 67. Many of the deliverables anticipated have not been achieved by the end of the first 6 quarters covered by this evaluation. Given the lack of baseline data, the late start or non-completion of many activities and the lack of access to beneficiaries due to travel prohibitions, it is not possible to comment on impact at this time.

68. Substantial and impressive groundwork was done to develop a coherent and credible analysis of the triggers of conflict and work with communities to identify possible interventions to help reduce tensions in target areas. The JP is well integrated with other UNDP conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities under the CPRU.
69. Despite the relatively small size of the budget, the JP has managed to develop a unique identity and provide a forum for better dialogue and relationship building between agencies working in Kadugli.
70. However, due to the length of the assessment process and the subsequent relocation of much of the UN presence in Kadugli, much of the tangible community interventions did not take place. The results of the JP have been heavy on assessments, light on 'peace dividends'; while the assessment process was excellent, much of the recommended interventions have not yet materialized due to the relocation of UN staff out of Kadugli just as most activities were just beginning.
71. While interagency coordination under the JP has been successful at avoiding duplication of efforts, activities undertaken by the agencies are implemented in relative isolation from each other and do not represent a comprehensive package of interventions in any one area. JP activities are agency activities (i.e. UNICEF trains PTA's and provides sanitation at schools, ILO uses its Local Economic Recovery toolkit); there is limited evidence of innovative approaches of enhanced joint programming amongst agencies.
72. Some tangible opportunities for partnerships between agencies were identified, but these have not been pursued following the reduction of presence of UN agencies in Kadugli.
73. Sustainability of the JP interventions is at risk due to the long absence of many agencies; the JP team should develop a joint plan for how individual agencies will provide longer-term support in areas where project activities have taken place was they are able to resume normal operations.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

	Conclusions	Recommendations
1.	The JP had several significant structural design issues that have contributed to a lack of coherence and a fragmented approach to delivery.	The NCS/JP Management should identify areas of convergence where the inherent fragmentation can be reduced, such as functionally combining outputs where there is opportunity for genuine collaboration between agencies.
2.	There is a lack of clarity regarding expenditures and total agency budgets (in some cases) between North and South. This makes it difficult for the JP as a whole to present itself accurately to the Government and to plan a 'whole JP' approach.	Agencies should clarify to the NSC on total budget and expenditure information for JP activities in Sudan. This will be required for reporting to the MDG-F for the second half of 2011.
3.	There was no credible case made on the value of including so many (8) UN agencies under the project, or how they would fit together to produce coherent, strategic impact. The disparate mandates, local focus and (lack of) presence in Kadugli make genuine joint implementation an elusive goal.	Collaboration between agencies should be strategic and rational, based on complimentary activities and priorities in the JP target areas. Potential areas of synergy emerged during the evaluation mission, such as FAO and IOM in terms of planning water yard locations based on stock migration routes. These more specific opportunities for joint action should be identified and pursued, as they are more likely to a) occur, and b) have an added value in doing so.
4.	The JP is in a state of stasis with no fixed end date or viable solutions; since June, many agencies with planned activities are in a holding pattern. Several agencies have contracts (eg FAO, UNFPA) with IP's that cannot implement activities due to the security situation, but no action has been	If contracts cannot be fulfilled because of security restrictions for certain IP's, alternative partners should be sought or funding reallocated to agencies that are better equipped to implement activities in the current situation. The justification for using those IP's was they could access areas where UN

	taken to remedy this in the past six months.	agencies could not; if this is not the case then new solutions are needed and the existing contracts should be terminated.
5	Progress to date has been heavy on assessments, comparatively light on tangible “dividends of peace” that are considered to be a cornerstone of the JP’s approach. This is largely due to bad timing; just as many activities were poised to start, UN staff were relocated out of SKS, effectively halting the work of many agencies	Stronger focus should be put on providing some tangible support to affected communities, within a coherent framework, once access is resumed. If needed, alternative IP’s should be sought if contracted organizations are unable to access target areas.
6.	Despite its importance throughout the lifecycle of the project cycle, particularly in a volatile operating environment such as Southern Kordofan, risk management is not being done.	A risk management plan should be developed/updated looking forward at the final months of the project. The updated risk matrix should be supplied to the NSC prior to meetings to ensure management is fully informed of current risks and proposed mitigation steps.
7.	The conflict sensitivity training conducted by UNDP for partner agencies was extremely useful, with agencies reporting that it influenced their programming in the JP and other interventions. It is a positive example of interagency collaboration that can have wide ranging impact on the quality of crisis/post-conflict programming in Sudan.	This type of training should be expanded, focusing (based on feedback) on more practical elements of conflict sensitive implementation.
8.	Linkages between the activities and actors operating in Warrup and SKS did not materialize as envisioned in the project document.	The JP could provide a forum for an interagency discussion amongst agencies working in Warrup and SKS to discuss trends, lessons learned and identify more coherent UN responses.
9.	The joint assessments provided an informed basis for programming, although it is unclear that they had any substantial impact on informing agencies’ decisions about what activities they would engage in.	JP activities need to be reviewed in a NSC setting to ensure that activities are appropriate to the context, and that functional linkages can be developed between agency activities to the degree possible.

10.	The composition of the PMC in Kadugli does not appropriately represent key line ministries, which may contribute to a lack of alignment with wider governmental priorities.	Enhanced representation of key line ministry representatives should be pursued when the PMC is reestablished in Kadugli.
11.	Buram is considered to be completely off limits to all agencies due to security issues and there is no indication that this will change in the foreseeable future.	An alternative locality should be selected as urgently as possible, considering the principles of balance, 'do no harm' and accessibility.
12.	Given the long delay in activities due to access restrictions, there is very little chance the JP will achieve all of its planned outputs and outcomes in the time allotted.	With the unpredictability of the operating environment, coupled with a somewhat passive approach to seeking new solutions in many cases, an extension should not be considered at this time until a shift occurs in forward planning. Any extension request should be predicated on a sound plan of action that addresses the challenges in a concrete, realistic manner.
13.	A communication strategy has been developed, which has provided good internal communications and developed a fairly clear identity for the JP as a unique initiative.	External communications could be strengthened to raise the public visibility of the project, highlighting the fact that the UN agencies involved are working in partnership to promote peacebuilding in Sudan through visibility efforts focused on target areas. This would be particularly important when/if activities resume in a more substantial manner.
14.	Sustainability of interventions (completed and upcoming) is at risk due to the lengthy break in activities and the geographical spread of target areas.	A plan should be developed on how gains made will be sustained over time, likely done by assigning responsibility for this to individual agencies following the closure of the project.

## Annex 1: List of Persons Met

Name	Position
<b>UN Staff</b>	
Adnan Cheema	JP Programme Coordinator
Pontus Ohrstedt	Head, CPRU, UNDP
Nurhaida Rahim	JP Project Officer, UNDP
Samuel Rizk	Peace and Development Advisor
Momodou Dibba	Protocol Area Regional Coordinator/JCRP Manager
Anders Haugland	Coordinator, CRMA Project
Maximo Halty	Chief Technical Advisor, CRMA Project
Carlos Albisu	Coordination Specialist, RCSO
Tomiyama Tatsuaki	Head of Kadugli Sub-office, IOM
Johannes Braun	Deputy Programme Coordinator-Community Stabilization and Elections Unit, IOM
Rania Yousif	National Programme Officer-Programme Unit, IOM
Rabab M. A. Baldo	Senior Programme Specialist, UN Women
Abdel Moneim	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, UN Women
Andrea Cullinan	Senior Advisor, UN Women
Soledad Herrero Lamo de Espinosa	State Representative, Southern Kordofan, UNICEF
Nawshad Ahmed	Planning, Research, M&E Manager, UNICEF
Suzan Elsadig Abdelslam	Programme Officer, ILO
Yonis Berkele Abraham	Area Coordinator-Kadugli, FAO
Mohamed Mekki Daldoum	Programme Assistant, FAO

Anton Glaeser	Senior Project Coordinator, FAO
<b>Government Staff</b>	
Ahmed Hussein Ahmed	Director, UN Agencies, Ministry of International Cooperation
Mohammed Mahgoub	Program Officer, Ministry of International Cooperation
Etidal Rizig	Program Officer, Ministry of International Cooperation
<b>AECID</b>	
Emma Pacios	Development Advisor, AECID

## **Annex 2: Terms of Reference**

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### **EVALUATION OF JOINT PROGRAMMES ON CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING**

#### **General Context: the MDG-F Conflict Prevention and peace Building Window**

In December 2006, the UNDP and the Government of Spain signed a major partnership agreement for the amount of €528 million with the aim of contributing to progress on the MDGs and other development goals through the United Nations System. In addition, on 24 September 2008 Spain pledged €90 million towards the launch of a thematic window on Childhood and Nutrition. The MDGF supports countries in their progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and other development goals by funding innovative programmes that have an impact on the population and potential for duplication.

The MDGF operates through the UN teams in each country, promoting increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions through collaboration among UN agencies. The Fund uses a joint programme mode of intervention and has currently approved 128 joint programmes in 49 countries. These reflect eight thematic windows that contribute in various ways towards progress on the MDGs.

The 11 programmes in this window seek to contribute to the achievement of 3 of main goals through interventions tackling conflict prevention and violence reduction, livelihood improvements against youth violence, and the fostering of dialog. These outcomes represent a variety of direct and indirect approaches to building peace and preventing conflicts. One common premise is ensuring that people know and exert their rights as an important component of a peace building and conflict prevention strategy, and appears as an outcome of many Joint Programs as well. Some joint programmes also pursue specific outcomes that are relevant in their context and situation, such as helping returnees and building public spaces.

Virtually all stakeholders in the joint programme within this window involve supporting the government, at the national and/or local levels. Many programs also engage civil society, community, and/or indigenous organizations and leaders.

#### **The following points should be provided by the joint programme team**

- Describe the joint programme, programme name and goals; include when it started, what outputs and outcomes are sought, its contribution to the MDGs at the local and national levels, its duration and current stage of implementation.

- Summarize the joint programme's scale of complexity, including its components, targeted participants (direct and indirect), geographical scope (regions) and the socio-economic context in which it operates.
- It is also useful to describe the human and financial resources that the joint programme has at its disposal, the number of programme implementation partners (UN, national and local governments and other stakeholders in programme implementation).
- Changes noted in the programme since implementation began, and how the programme fits in with the priorities of the UNDAF and the National Development Strategies.

## 2. OVERALL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION

One of the roles of the Secretariat is to monitor and evaluate the MDGF. This role is fulfilled in line with the instructions contained in the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund. These documents stipulate that all joint programmes lasting longer than two years will be subject to a mid-term evaluation.

Mid-term evaluations are highly formative in nature and seek to **improve implementation of the joint programmes during their second phase of implementation. They also seek and generate knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons learned** that could be transferred to other programmes. As a result, the conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation will be addressed to its main users: the Programme Management Committee, the National Steering Committee and the Secretariat of the Fund.

## 3. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC GOALS

The mid-term evaluation will use an expedited process to carry out a systematic, fast-paced analysis of the design, process and results or results trends of the **joint programme**, based on the scope and criteria included in these terms of reference. This will enable conclusions and recommendations for the joint programme to be formed within a period of approximately three months.

**The unit of analysis or object of study for this interim evaluation is the joint programme**, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.

This mid-term evaluation has the following **specific objectives**:

74. To discover the programme's **design quality and internal coherence** (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies and the **Millennium Development Goals**, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.
75. To understand how the joint programme **operates** and assess the **efficiency of its management model** in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated

for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the **One UN** framework.

76. To identify the programme's **degree of effectiveness** among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the **Economic Governance thematic window**, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

#### 4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS, LEVELS AND CRITERIA

**The main users of the evaluation represented in the evaluation reference group (Section 8 of the TOR), and specifically the coordination and implementation unit of the joint programme, are responsible for contributing to this section. Evaluation questions and criteria may be added or modified up to a reasonable limit, bearing in mind the viability and the limitations (resources, time, etc.) of a quick mid-term evaluation exercise.**

The evaluation questions define the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. The questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn, grouped according to the three levels of the programme.

##### Design level:

- **Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country, the Millennium Development Goals and the policies of associates and donors.**
- a) Is the identification of the problems, with their respective causes, clear in the joint programme?
- b) Does the Joint Programme take into account the particularities and specific interests of women and men in the areas of intervention?
- c) To what extent has the intervention strategy been adapted to the areas of intervention in which it is being implemented? What actions does the programme envisage, to respond to obstacles that may arise from the political and socio-cultural background?
- d) Are the follow-up indicators relevant and do they meet the quality needed to measure the outputs and outcomes of the joint programme?
- e) To what extent has the MDG-F Secretariat contributed to raising the quality of the design of the joint programmes?

- **Ownership in the design: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's social agents in development interventions**

77. To what extent do the intervention objectives and strategies of the Joint Programme respond to national and regional plans and programmes, to identified needs, and to the operational context of national politics?

78. To what extent have the country's national and local authorities and social agents been taken into consideration, participated, or have become involved, at the design stage of the development intervention?

**Process level**

- **Efficiency: Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, etc.) have been turned into results**

- a) To what extent does the joint programme's management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision-making in management) contribute to obtaining the predicted products and results?
- b) To what extent are the participating agencies coordinating with each other, with the government and with civil society? Is there a methodology underpinning the work and internal communications that contributes to the joint implementation?
- c) Are there efficient coordination mechanisms to avoid overloading the counterparts, participating population/actors?
- d) Is the pace of implementing the products of the programme ensuring the completeness of the results of the joint programme? How do the different components of the joint programme interrelate?
- e) Are work methodologies, financial instruments, etc. shared among agencies, institutions and Joint Programmes?
- f) Have more efficient (sensitive) and appropriate measures been adopted to respond to the political and socio-cultural problems identified?

- **Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's social agents in development interventions**

- g) To what extent have the target population and participants made the programme their own, taking an active role in it? What modes of participation have taken place?
- h) To what extent have public/private national resources and/or counterparts been mobilized to contribute to the programme's objective and produce results and impacts?

### Results level

**- Effectiveness: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved or are expected to be achieved, bearing in mind their relative importance.**

- a) Is the programme making progress towards achieving the stipulated results?
  - a. To what extent and in what ways is the joint programme contributing to the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels?
  - b. To what extent is the programme contributing to the goals set by the thematic window, and in what ways?
- b) Is the stipulated timeline of outputs being met? What factors are contributing to progress or delay in the achievement of the outputs and outcomes?
- c) Do the outputs produced meet the required high quality?
- d) Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?
- e) Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?
- f) Is the programme providing coverage to beneficiaries as planned?
- g) In what way has the programme come up with innovative measures for problem-solving?
- h) Have any good practices, success stories, or transferable examples been identified?
- i) In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of fair youth employment?
- j) In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of internal and/or external migration?
- k) What types of differentiated effects are resulting from the joint programme in accordance with the sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting of the beneficiary population, and to what extent?

### **Sustainability: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.**

- a) Are the necessary premises occurring to ensure the sustainability of the effects of the joint programme?

At local and national level:

- i. Is the programme supported by national and/or local institutions?
- ii. Are these institutions showing technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme and to repeat it?
- iii. Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national partners?

- iv. Do the partners have sufficient financial capacity to keep up the benefits produced by the programme?
- v. Is the duration of the programme sufficient to ensure a cycle that will project the sustainability of the interventions?
- b) To what extent are the visions and actions of the partners consistent or divergent with regard to the joint programme?
- c) In what ways can the governance of the joint programme be improved so that it has greater likelihood of achieving future sustainability?

## 5. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The mid-term evaluations will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the TOR, the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. In all cases, consultants are expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as annual reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form opinions. Consultants are also expected to use interviews as a means to collect relevant data for the evaluation.

The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the desk study report and the final evaluation report, and should contain, at minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques.

## 6. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The consultant is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the Secretariat of the MDGF:

☞ **Inception Report** (to be submitted within fifteen days of the submission of all programme documentation to the consultant)

This report will be 10 to 15 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The desk study report will propose initial lines of inquiry about the joint programme this report will be used as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the consultant and the evaluation managers. The report will follow this outline:

### 0. Introduction

#### 1. Background to the evaluation: objectives and overall approach

#### 2. Identification of main units and dimensions for analysis and possible areas for research

#### 3. Main substantive and financial achievements of the joint programme

#### **4. Methodology for the compilation and analysis of the information**

#### **5. Criteria to define the mission agenda, including “field visits”**

##### **⌘ Draft Final Report** (to be submitted within 15 days of completion of the field visit)

The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 20 to 30 pages in length. This report will be shared among the evaluation reference group. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be shared with evaluation reference group to seek their comments and suggestions. This report will contain the same sections as the final report, described below.

##### **⌘ Final Evaluation Report** (to be submitted within ten days of receipt of the draft final report with comments)

The final report will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be sent to the evaluation reference group. This report will contain the following sections at a minimum:

1. Cover Page
2. Introduction
  - Background, goal and methodological approach
  - Purpose of the evaluation
  - Methodology used in the evaluation
  - Constraints and limitations on the study conducted
3. Description of interventions carried out
  - - Initial concept
  - - Detailed description of its development: description of the hypothesis of change in the programme.
4. Levels of Analysis: Evaluation criteria and questions
5. Conclusions and lessons learned (prioritized, structured and clear)
6. Recommendations
7. Annexes

#### **7. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES OF THE EVALUATION**

The mid-term evaluation of the joint programme is to be carried out according to ethical principles and standards established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

- **Anonymity and confidentiality.** The evaluation must respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.
- **Responsibility.** The report must mention any dispute or difference of opinion that may have arisen among the consultants or between the consultant and the heads of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/or recommendations. The team must corroborate all assertions, or disagreement with them noted.
- **Integrity.** The evaluator will be responsible for highlighting issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is needed to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.
- **Independence.** The consultant should ensure his or her independence from the intervention under review, and he or she must not be associated with its management or any element thereof.
- **Incidents.** If problems arise during the fieldwork, or at any other stage of the evaluation, they must be reported immediately to the Secretariat of the MDGF. If this is not done, the existence of such problems may in no case be used to justify the failure to obtain the results stipulated by the Secretariat of the MDGF in these terms of reference.
- **Validation of information.** The consultant will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected while preparing the reports and will be ultimately responsible for the information presented in the evaluation report.
- **Intellectual property.** In handling information sources, the consultant shall respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities that are under review.
- **Delivery of reports.** If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than what was agreed, the penalties stipulated in these terms of reference will be applicable.

## 8. ROLES OF ACTORS IN THE EVALUATION

The main actors in the mid-term evaluation process are the MDGF Secretariat, the management team of the joint programme and the Programme Management Committee that could be expanded to accommodate additional relevant stakeholders. This group of institutions and individuals will serve as the evaluation reference group. The role of the evaluation reference group will extend to all phases of the evaluation, including:

- Facilitating the participation of those involved in the evaluation design.

- Identifying information needs, defining objectives and delimiting the scope of the evaluation.
- Providing input on the evaluation planning documents,( Work Plan and Communication, Dissemination and Improvement Plan).
- Providing input and participating in the drafting of the Terms of Reference.
- Facilitating the evaluation team’s access to all information and documentation relevant to the intervention, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods.
- Monitoring the quality of the process and the documents and reports that are generated, so as to enrich these with their input and ensure that they address their interests and needs for information about the intervention.
- Disseminating the results of the evaluation, especially among the organizations and entities within their interest group.

The MDGF Secretariat shall promote and manage Joint Programme mid-term evaluation in its role as commissioner of the evaluation, fulfilling the mandate to conduct and finance the joint programme evaluation. As manager of the evaluation, the Secretariat will be responsible for ensuring that the evaluation process is conducted as stipulated, promoting and leading the evaluation design; coordinating and monitoring progress and development in the evaluation study and the quality of the process.

## 9. TIMELINE FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS

**A. Preparation of the evaluation (approximately 45-60 days before the date the programme reaches a year and a half of implementation). These preparatory activities are not part of the evaluation as they precede the evaluation exercise.**

1. An official e-mail from the Secretariat is sent to the RC, coordination officers in the country and joint programme coordinator. This mail will include the official starting date of the evaluation, instructive on mid-term evaluation and generic TOR for the evaluation.
2. During this period the evaluation reference group is established, the TOR are adapted to the context and interest of stakeholders in the country and all relevant documents on the joint programme are sent to the evaluator.

This activity requires a dialogue between the Secretariat and the reference group of the evaluation (the body that comments on and reviews but does not interfere with the independent evaluation process). This dialogue should be aimed at rounding out and modifying some of the questions and dimensions of the study that the generic TOR do not cover, or which are inadequate or irrelevant to the joint programme.

3. The Secretariat's portfolios manager will discuss with the country an initial date for having the field visit.

4. From this point on, the evaluation specialists and the portfolio manager are responsible for managing the execution of the evaluation, with three main functions: to facilitate the work of the consultant, to serve as interlocutor between the parties (consultant, joint programme team in the country, etc.), and to review the deliverables that are produced.

#### **B. Execution phase of the evaluation study (87-92 days total)**

##### **Desk study (23 days total)**

1. Briefing with the consultant (**1 day**). A checklist of activities and documents to review will be submitted, and the evaluation process will be explained. Discussion will take place over what the evaluation should entail.
2. Review of documents according to the standard list (see TOR annexes; programme document, financial, monitoring reports etc.).
3. Submission of the inception report including the findings from the document review specifying how the evaluation will be conducted. The inception report is sent and shared with the evaluation reference group for comments and suggestions (within **fifteen days of delivery of all programme documentation to the consultant**).
4. The focal person for the evaluation (joint programme coordinator, resident coordinator office, etc) and the consultant prepare and agenda to conduct the field visit of the evaluation. (Interview with programme participants, stakeholders, focus groups, etc) (Within **seven days of delivery of the desk study report**).

##### **Field visit (10-15 days)**

1. The consultant will travel to the country to observe and contrast the preliminary conclusions reached through the study of the document revision. The planned agenda will be carried out. To accomplish this, the Secretariat's programme officer may need to facilitate the consultant's visit by means of phone calls and emails, making sure there is a focal person in the country who is his/her natural interlocutor by default.
2. The consultant will be responsible for conducting a debriefing with the key actors he or she has interacted with.

##### **Final Report (54 days total)**

1. The consultant will deliver a draft final report, which the Secretariat's programme officer shall be responsible for sharing with the evaluation reference group (**within fifteen days of the completion of the field visit**).

2. The Secretariat will assess the quality of the evaluation reports presented using the criteria stipulated by UNEG and DAC Evaluation Network (**within seven days of delivery of the draft final report**).
3. The evaluation reference group may ask that data or facts that it believes are incorrect be changed, as long as it provides data or evidence that supports its request. The evaluator will have the final say over whether to accept or reject such changes. For the sake of evaluation quality, the Secretariat can and should intervene so that erroneous data, and opinions based on erroneous data or not based on evidence, are changed (**within fifteen days of delivery of the draft final report**).

The evaluation reference group may also comment on the value judgements contained in the evaluation, but these may not affect the evaluator's freedom to express the conclusions and recommendations he or she deems appropriate, based on the evidence and criteria established.

All comments will be compiled in a matrix that the Secretariat will provide to the evaluation focal points.

4. On the completion of input from the reference group, the evaluator shall decide which input to incorporate and which to omit (**ten days**) and submit to the MDG-F Secretariat a final evaluation report.
5. The Secretariat will review the final copy of the report, and this phase will conclude with the delivery of this report to the evaluation reference group in the country (**within seven days of delivery of the draft final report with comments**).

**C. Phase of incorporating recommendations and improvement plan (within fifteen days of delivery of the final report):**

1. The Secretariat's programme officer, as representative of the Secretariat, shall engage in a dialogue with the joint programme managers to establish an improvement plan that includes recommendations from the evaluation.
2. The Secretariat will publish the evaluation in its website.

## **10. ANNEXES**

### **a) Document Review**

**This section must be completed and specified by the other users of the evaluation but mainly by the management team of the joint programme and by the Programme Management Committee. A minimum of documents that must be reviewed before the field trip shall be established; in general terms the Secretariat estimates that these shall include, as a minimum:**

#### MDG-F Context

- MDGF Framework Document
- Summary of the M&E frameworks and common indicators
- General thematic indicators
- M&E strategy
- Communication and Advocacy Strategy
- MDG-F Joint Implementation Guidelines

#### Specific Joint Programme Documents

- Joint Programme Document: results framework and monitoring and evaluation framework
- Mission reports from the Secretariat
- Quarterly reports
- Mini-monitoring reports
- Biannual monitoring reports
- Annual reports
- Annual work plan
- Financial information (MDTF)

#### Other in-country documents or information

- Evaluations, assessments or internal reports conducted by the joint programme
- Relevant documents or reports on the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels
- Relevant documents or reports on the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in the country
- Relevant documents or reports on One UN, Delivering as One

### **c) File for the Joint Programme Improvement Plan**

After the interim evaluation is complete, the phase of incorporating its recommendations shall begin. This file is to be used as the basis for establishing an improvement plan for the joint programme, which will bring together all the recommendations, actions to be carried out by programme management.

**Evaluation Recommendation No. 1**

**Response from the Joint Programme Management**

Key actions	Time frame	Person responsible	Follow-up	
1.1			Comments	Status
1.2				
1.3				
<b>Evaluation Recommendation No. 2</b>				
<b>Response from the Joint Programme Management</b>				
Key actions	Time frame	Person responsible	Follow-up	
2.1			Comments	Status
2.2				
2.3				
<b>Evaluation Recommendation No. 3</b>				
<b>Response from the Joint Programme Management</b>				
Key actions	Time frame	Person responsible	Follow-up	
3.1			Comments	Status
3.2				
3.3				

